Abstract. In this paper we give an introduction to elliptic curve public key cryptosystems. We explain how the discrete logarithm in an elliptic curve group can be used to construct cryptosystems. We also focus on practical aspects such as implementation, standardization and intellectual property.
Introduction
Elliptic curves have been studied by mathematicians for more than a century. An extremely rich theory has been developed around them, and they have in turn been at the basis of new developments in mathematics, the proof of Fermat's last theorem being the most notable one. As far as cryptography is concerned, elliptic curves have been used for factoring L87] and primality proving AM93].
Elliptic curve public key cryptosystems (ECPKCs) were proposed independently by Victor Miller M85] and Neil Koblitz K87] in the mid-eighties. As with all cryptosystems, and especially with public key cryptosystems, it takes years of public evaluation before a reasonable level of con dence in a new system is established. ECPKCs seem to have reached that level now, and in the last couple of years, the rst commercial implementations are appearing, as toolkits but also in real-world applications, such as email security, web security, smart cards, etc. A summary of theoretical and practical aspects of ECPKCs can be found in M93].
In the remainder of this article, we will rst describe the elliptic curve group and explain how public key cryptosystems can be based on it. Then we will continue with some more practical aspects, such as implementation, standardization and patents.
The Elliptic Curve Group
An elliptic curve is an equation of the form An equation of this kind can be studied over various mathematical structures, such as a ring or a eld. For our purposes, we will only consider elliptic curves over a eld. In this case, the coe cients a i are in the eld, and we look at all pairs (x; y), with x and y in the eld, that satisfy the equation. Figure 1 gives an example of an elliptic curve over the eld of real numbers R. This graph can be obtained by lling in values for x, and solving a quadratic equation in y. In this particular case, the graph consists of two separated parts, but this is not always the case.
It turns out that the set of solutions of an elliptic curve has some interesting properties. In particular, a group operation can be embedded in this set, and in this way, we obtain a group, which enables us to do cryptography, as we will see in section 3. Since a group is an important concept for this, we will review its de nition.
A group is a mathematical structure, consisting of a set of elements G, with a group operation de ned on the elements of the set. In order to have a group, the operation must satisfy the following properties:
{ closure: for all x, y in G, x y must be in G; { associativity: for all x, y and z in G, we must have (x y) z = x (y z); { identity: there exists an e in G such that x e = e x = x for all x; { inverse: for all x there exists a y such that x y = y x = e.
If on top of that, we have the abelian property:
{ abelian: for all x, y in G, we have x y = y x, then we say that the group is abelian. Now, how can the set of points on an elliptic curve be turned into a group? How should we de ne an operation on curve points, with the properties mentioned in the previous paragraph? This can be done as follows. Take two points on the curve, P 1 and P 2 and construct the line through these 2 points. In the general case, this line will always have a third point of intersection with the curve. Now take this third point and construct a vertical line through it. The other point of intersection of this vertical line with the curve is de ned as the sum of P 1 and P 2 . If P 1 and P 2 are equal, then the line to be constructed in the rst step is the tangent to the curve, which again has exactly one other point of intersection with the curve. This group law is illustrated in gure 1. Note that the group is abelian; additive notation is often used for the group law of an abelian group.
An important question that still needs to be answered is what the identity of the group is. For example, in gure 1, what point should be added to P 3 to obtain P 3 as the sum? We can only nd an answer to this question if an extra point at in nity O is added to the curve, which lies in nitely far on the vertical axis. This point O is the identity of the elliptic curve group. Now, it can be shown that this operation is a properly de ned group operation, although some of the requirements (e.g. associativity) are far from trivial to prove.
For applications in cryptography, it is not very practical to construct the result of a group operation in a graphical way. a closed formula that gives the coordinates (x S ; y S ) of the sum P S of two points P 1 and P 2 as a function of their coordinates (x 1 ; y 1 ) and (x 2 ; y 2 ). For the case of real numbers, the curve equation can be simpli ed to the form These equations hold except for the trivial cases where P 1 or P 2 are equal to the point at in nity, or where ?P 1 , which has coordinates (x 1 ; ?y 1 ), is equal to P 2 .
A disadvantage of using the real numbers for cryptography, is that it is very hard to store them precisely in computer memory, and to predict how much storage we will need for them. This problem can be solved by using nite elds, i.e. elds with a nite number of elements. Since the number of elements is nite, we can nd a unique representation for each of them, which allows us to store and handle the elements in a manageable way. Two types of nite elds are popular for use in ECPKCs: elds of the form GF(p), with p prime, and elds of the form GF(2 n ), with n a positive integer. We will discuss both elds in more detail in section 5.
Finite elds are hard to represent in a graphical way, and hence we have to rely on closed formulas for the group operation. For GF(p), the formulas are the same as for the reals; for GF(2 n ) they are slightly di erent (see section 5).
Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems
Many public key cryptosystems are based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in a group. We will give some examples for arbitrary groups, and then restrict our attention to elliptic curves.
The DLP in a group G; can be de ned as follows. Suppose that x and y are elements of G and that y was obtained by applying the group operation to x an unkown number of times, i.e. y = x x : : : x, with the number of terms in the righthand side of the equation equal to n, where n is unknown. Alternatively, we note y = x n . Then the DLP consists of nding n, knowing only x and y and the characteristics of the group.
How easy it is to solve the DLP depends on the characteristics of the group G. In a general group, without extra properties that allow for`shortcuts', the DLP is a hard problem, in the sense that the complexity of the best known algorithms increases exponentially with the size of the group. However, a number of interesting groups have additional structure that enable the application of faster algorithms, making these groups less suitable (but not necessarily useless) for cryptography. Examples of the latter are Z p ; and GF(2 n ); , where subexponential algorithms for solving the DLP are known.
The Di e-Hellman key agreement protocol is an example of how a public key cryptosystem can be constructed based on the DLP in a group (see also gure 2):
Alice Bob Communication Alice computes g a and sends it to Bob over a public channel;
Bob sends g b to Alice. Although g a and g b are closely related to a and b respectively, hardness of the DLP ensures that the secret keys cannot be computed from them in a practical situation. Therefore, g a and g b can serve as public keys, corresponding to the private keys of Alice and Bob respectively.
Final step Alice takes Bob's public key and computes (g b ) a = g ab ; Bob computes (g a ) b = g ab . As we see, Alice and Bob obtain the same result, and this result could not be computed by an adversary who only knows the public keys. Therefore Alice and Bob have agreed on a shared secret key. Note that precautions need to be taken for this protocol to be secure. Not only do we have to choose a group where the DLP is hard, but also do we need to make sure that g is chosen in such a way that it has`many' di erent powers, i.e. that the set fg 0 ; g 1 ; g 2 ; : : :g is su ciently large (note that this set is nite if the group G is nite). In fact, the hardness of the DLP depends, apart from other factors, on the size of this set.
Up to now, we have not speci ed the particular group we are working in. Interesting candidates are groups where the DLP is hard to solve. Examples of groups that have been used for about 20 years are the multiplicative groups of nite elds, in particular Z p ; and GF(2 n ); . A number of shortcuts have been found to solve the DLP in these groups in sub-exponential time, but they are still practical for use in cryptography. Examples of public key systems based on the DLP in Z p ; are ElGamal signatures, ElGamal encryption and DSA MvV97].
In the mid-eighties, Victor Miller M85] and Neal Koblitz K87] independently proposed to use the group of an elliptic curve over a nite eld for public key cryptography. No shortcuts were known to solve the elliptic curve DLP (ECDLP) faster than in exponential time, and up to now, this is still the case, except for a number of degenerated classes of curves MOV93,S98a,S98b].
All DLP-based cryptosystems can be converted to elliptic curves, and so we have ECDSA, EC Di e-Hellman, EC ElGamal encryption, etc. Some slight technical modi cations are necessary in order to adapt to the elliptic curve setting, but the underlying principles are the same as for other DLP-based systems.
Comparison to other public key cryptosystems
How do elliptic curve public key cryptosystems compare to other popular systems such as their counterparts based on the group Z p ; or to systems based on integer factorization?
A very important observation is that the best known algorithms for the ECDLP have an exponential complexity, whereas DLP in Z p ; and integer factorization can be solved in sub-exponential time. This implies that, for a certain level of security, the sizes of the parameters can be substantially smaller. It is hard to obtain accurate security estimates for EC, but from private communications with experts in the eld, we can estimate that an elliptic curve group with a 170-bit size has a security that is equivalent to RSA with a 1024-bit modulus, or to systems based on DLP in Z p ; with p a 1024-bit prime.
The smaller block size has important implications on the resources that are needed to implement an ECPKC. For example, far less chip area is needed for an elliptic curve processor than for an RSA processor. In applications where bandwidth is an issue, elliptic curves can also o er an advantage: an elliptic curve signature is only 340 bits long, as opposed to 1024-bit long RSA-signatures (but note that DSA-signatures are only 320 bits long).
For a comparison of the performance of various public key cryptosystems we refer to section 5. The EC group operation is more complex than the core operations of other systems such as RSA, and therefore the smaller block size is not re ected proportionally in the performance gures.
Implementation issues
In this section we will discuss some aspects of software implementations for ECPKCs. The time consuming operation in an ECPKC is the multiplication of a point on a curve by an integer, i.e. the repeated group operation, also called EC exponentiation, since it is analogous to exponentiation in other discrete logarithm-based systems. An implementation of the repeated group operation will generally consist of two levels of hierarchy: the group operation level, and the level of calculating a point multiplication using single group operations. We will discuss both levels in seperate paragraphs.
Also, in section 2 we saw that in cryptography elliptic curves over two kinds of elds are used: GF(p) or GF(2 n ). We will discuss the group operation for both kinds of elds in seperate paragraphs.
Elliptic curve group operation over GF(p)
The formulas for the group operation on elliptic curves over GF(p) are given in section 2. From these, the group operation can be calculated in terms of a number of eld operations, such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and inversion. The eld GF(p) is usually represented by the integers modulo p, and hence the eld operations are modular operations, similar to the operations needed in other public key cryptosystems such as RSA or DSA. Therefore, parts of the software libraries for the latter can be reused for elliptic curves over GF(p).
The inversion operation deserves some extra attention, though. In most public key cryptosystems, modular inversion is not very important, but in ECPKCs it turns out to be the major bottleneck if the group operation is implemented in a straightforward way. Fortunately, it is possible to reduce the number of inversions by representing the points in projective coordinates I98].
Implementations of elliptic curves over GF(p) have been described in MOC97] and DMPW98]. Table 1 gives typical timings for the eld operations and the group operations for the GF(p) case.
Elliptic curve group operation over GF(2 n )
The elliptic curve equations and formulas for nite elds GF(2 n ) are slightly di erent. The curve equation can be simpli ed to Contrary to GF(p), a number of di erent representations are commonly used for the elements of a eld GF(2 n ). The most well known representation is in standard basis, where the elements are binary polynomials of degree smaller than n, and calculations are done modulo an irreducible binary polynomial of degree n. Another representation is based on optimal normal bases MOVW88]. In this case, elements are represented as linear combinations of the elements of the set f 2 0 ; 2 1 ; 2 2 ; : : : ; 2 n?1 g, where is a suitably chosen element of the eld. A third representation, sometimes called tower eld representation, represents the elements as polynomials over the eld GF(2 r ), where r is a divisor of n.
A number of implementations of ECPKCs over GF(2 n ) have appeared in litterature, based on these three representations; see DBV+96], DMPW98], GP97], HMV92] and SOOS95]. Table 1 gives typical timings for the eld operations and the group operations for GF(2 n ) using a standard basis. 
Point multiplication
As soon as we have algorithms for the group operation available, we want to look for a method that computes a point multiplication using as little group operations as possible. This corresponds to the problem of computing an exponentiation using multiplications in other cryptosystems such as RSA or DSA. A very simple algorithm for this is the square-and-multiply algorithm, see e.g. K81] . A number of optimizations to this algorithm are possible; G98] gives a good overview. An advantage of elliptic curves is that the inverse of a point can be computed very e ciently (see section 2). A comparison of di erent algorithms using this optimization can be found in DMPW98].
With the algorithms for point multiplication, we can start building various public key schemes. Table 2 compares the e ciency of signature schemes based on elliptic curves to other signature schemes.
Standardization
It took a number of years before manufacturers of cryptographic products got con dence in elliptic curve systems, but we seem to have reached that point now. A number of standardization bodies are undertaking e orts to create standards about elliptic curves. Although none of them have been o cially approved yet, most are quite mature and not expected to change much before approval. A broadly known initiative for a public key standard, including ECPKCs, is the IEEE P1363 working group, for which the authors have also delivered a number of contributions. More information, including the latest draft and directions on how to join the mailing list, can be found at their web site P1363].
The ANSI X9F1 working group is also working on a number of documents including elliptic curve-based systems, in particular X9.42 (DH/MQV key agreement), X9.62 (elliptic curve signatures) and X9.63 (elliptic curve key agreement/transport). More information can be found at X9].
Other organizations working on elliptic curve standards are ISO/IEC and the Internet Engineering Task Force.
Intellectual property issues
Contrary to RSA, the basic idea of ECPKCs has not been patented, and in the beginning this seemed to be an important advantage. In the past two years, a number of patents have been applied for on techniques that mostly aim at improving the e ciency. It should be noted that the situation is rather unclear since most of these patents are still pending. In principle, it should still be possible to construct a secure, albeit not extremely e cient, ECPKC without licensing patents.
A number of these techniques are being considered for inclusion in standards and this will potentially make it hard to implement interoperable elliptic curve systems without licensing patents. On the other hand, some standardization organizations require the holders of patents on standardized techniques to guarantee 'reasonable' licensing conditions. In summary, elliptic curves have lost many of their advantages as far as patents are concerned, but the situation is probably not worse than for other popular public key systems.
Conclusion
Elliptic curve public key cryptosystems are well on their way to being a serious alternative to older public key cryptosystems, in particular RSA. They can be implemented e ciently, and have a number of advantages that can make them the best choice in a range of applications. With a number of standards being in preparation, interoperability between the di erent product will be much easier to obtain. The patent situation is not as nice anymore as it used to be, but it should not be an important drawback either. One factor that still remains largely uncertain is the security: as with all practically used public key cryptosystems, their security has not been proven but is based on the inability to nd attacks. If attacks exist on any of these systems, they might be discovered sooner or later. In this case it is vital to be able to quickly switch to an alternative.
